Portland State University

PDXScholar
Business Faculty Publications and
Presentations

The School of Business

Fall 1998

The Evolving Role of Semiconductor Consortia in the
United States and Japan
Rose Marie Ham
University of California - Berkeley

Greg Linden
University of California - Berkeley

Melissa M. Appleyard
Portland State University, appleyar@pdx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/busadmin_fac
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Ham, R., Linden, G., & Appleyard, M. M. (1998). The Evolving Role of Semiconductor Consortia in the
United States and Japan. California Management Review, 41(1), 137-163.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Business Faculty
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make
this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

The Evolving Role
of Semiconductor
Consortia in the United
States and Japan
Rose Marie Ham
Greg Linden
Melissa M. Appleyard

S

ince the late 1970s, governments throughout the industrialized
economics have proclaimed the benefits of research consortia. In the
United States, tor example, ihe 1984 National Cooperative Research
Act (NCRA) relaxed U.S. antitrust laws to encourage the formation of
research consortia hy firms in the same industry; by the end of 1995, over 575
consortia had heen registered under the NCRA in a variety of industries, including automobiles, aerospace, and telecommunications.' Governments in the
United States, Japan, and Western Europe also launched a myriad of cooperative
R&D programs during the 1980s, often providing subsidies to large-scale consortia among firms in "strategic" high-technology industries,^ These policy initiatives were fueled by concerns over the competitiveness of domestic firms in
high-technology sectors combined with the perceived advantages of research
consortia'—by banding together in cooperative R&D activities, firms could share
the risks and costs associated with technology generation and thereby compete
more effectively in international markets.
The semiconductor industry has pioneered in these large-scale R&D consortia."' In part, the leading role of this industry in programs establishing R&D
We gratefully acknowledge William J. Spencer (SEMATECH), Frank Robertson (13001), Hrroyoshi
Komi)g (Selete),Taro Okabe (SIRIJ), and other representatives from the semiconductor industry for
shanng their time and insights with us. We also thank David Mowery for his useful comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this article, Jeff Macher for his assistance in obtaining industry data,
and George Lee of the SEMI trade association for enabling us to attend SEMI conferences on the
300mm wafer transition. Support for this research was provided by the Califorr)\a Management Rewew,
the Darden Foundation (Appleyard). the Alfred P Sloan Foundation (Appleyard and Ham), and the Air
Fon:e Office of Scientific Ftesearch (Ham).The authoi'^ assume full responsibility for any remaining
errors or omissions.
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consortia refleas its high political saliency in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Recognizing that semiconductors are critical inputs to a broad base
of electronics, telecommunications, and military-related technologies, governments have promoted a strong domestic semiconductor industry and a viable
base of domestic firms to supply the tools and materials used in semiconductor
manufaauring. At the same time, these national objectives have had to confront
the global realities of the semiconductor industry: semiconductor manufacturers
have long operated produaion facilities throughout the industrialized world,
and manufacturers and supplier firms are enmeshed in a complex web of
alliances within and across national borders.^
Two of tbe mosi influential higb-technology R&D consortia of the past 30
years were established with tbe aid of public funds to support semiconduaorrelated R&D. During the mid-1970s, the Japanese government, concerned about
the survival of its computer industry in tbe face of market liberalization, established tbe Very Large Scale Integration (VLSf) Project to improve domestic capabilities lor manufacturing semiconductor devices used in mainframe computers.*
The VLSI Projea, along with a parallel set of semiconduaor projeas sponsored
by Japan's state-owned telecommunications firm (NTT), was later credited witb
enabling Japanese semiconductor firms to "catcb up' with U.S. firms in tbis
industry.' By tbe mid-1980s, Japanese firms had surpassed U.S. device makers in
tbe worldwide markets for semiconductor memory devices. This rise to dominance of Japanese semiconductor manufacturers ignited debate in tbe United
States over the beallb of tbe U.S. semiconductor industry and the potential
dependence by U.S. defense agencies on Japanese firms for semiconductors used
in military systems. In response, the U.S. govemment and leading U.S. semiconductor manufaaurers launched tbe U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology (SEMATECH) consortium in 1987 in order to improve the manufacturing
capabilities of domestic semiconductor firms.
This article examines a new chapter in the history of large-scale semiconduaor consortia in the United States and Japan. By focusing on two recently
establisbed consortia—tbe Intertiational 300mm Initiative (I300I) in the United
States and Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies, Inc. (Selete) in Japan—
we examine the changing role of governments and private firms in directing
technology development in the semiconduaor industry.^ Unlike the VLSI Project
and SEMATECH consortia, both I300I and Selete have been financed solely by
member compatiies and are working with a global base of supplier firms, apparently heralding a sea change in relations between the semiconductor industry
atid national governments. These consortia also include leading semiconductor
manufacturers from around the world, which refiects the need to spread costs
across a larger number of firms and higblights the new prominence of Taiwanese
and Soutb Korean firms in semiconductor manufacturing.
This article examines the factors that gave rise to these new semiconductor R&D consortia in the United States and in Japan—namely, the costly conversion to larger silicon wafers that alters many of the industry's manufacturing
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technologies.'* It then discusses the origins and structures of these consortia and
examines the unprecedented level of cooperation among leading semiconductor
manufacturers that is taking place. Although their efforts are still underway, the
consortia have already confronted the difficulties associated with large-scale
collaborative R&D endeavors that involve uncertain technologies and volatile
market forces. The semiconductor industry may be unique in sustaining this
level of industry-wide cooperation, but the lessons from the current semiconductor consortia apply to managers involved in large-scale collaborative ventures
in other technology-intensive industries.
With respect to the role of government, the two consortia highlight divergent trends. 13001 illustrates the political challenges associated with transforming
a domestically oriented, federally subsidized consortium into an institution supported solely by dues from domestic and foreign firms. By contrast, Selete was
formed in conjunaion with a new wave of government-funded semiconductor
R&D projects in Japan, and the private consortium shares important ties with
these parallel, public-sector initiatives. Despite predictions that the actions of
national governments will be curtailed in an era of global, high-techno logy
firms,'" home-country governments continue to exercise considerable influence
on these private initiatives, as they do in other high-technology sectors.
Nonetheless, the ultimate effects of government initiatives may be more easily
offset or even derailed by the actions of global firms.

The Challenge of Converting to 300mm Wafers
The semiconductor industry has a unique combination of capital- and
research-intensity that, combined with short product life cycles and a rapid pace
of technological change in the industry, magnifies investment risks for firms."
Individual semiconductor investments are quite large, with new factories
(known as "fabs") costing at least $1 billion. At the same time, the pace of semiconductor technology development has increased, shortening the useful life of
capital investments. According to an industry executive: "In the mid-80s, a fab
cost about $100 million and had an expected life span of nearly 10 years. Now
we have $1 billion fabs with a life span of only five years."'^
Semiconductor manufacturing processes also are among the most complex in any industry.'* The fabrication of an integrated circuit (also known as a
"chip" or "device") requires more than a hundred steps (such as patterning,
coating, baking, etching) across a range of specialized tool sets. An average fabrication facility in 1997 utilized about 40 different types of equipment, with individual tools ranging in price from $100,000 to $7 million.'' The individual
manufacturing steps are often mastered at an experimental rather than a scientific level and are difficult to replicate on different tools or in different facilities.
Such complexity has historically required manufacturers to work ck>scly with
equipment suppliers to improve the performance of each tool.
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In response to the soaring capital costs and risks of semiconduaor manufacturing, producers throughout the world have developed an array of strategies,
among the most important of which is interfirm collaboration in R&D and production investments. A new challenge has given an additional impetus to these
collaborative trends. Driven by the need to produce increasing numbers of semiconductor chips at lower prices, semiconductor manufacturers and their equipment suppliers are now preparing to upgrade their manufacturing methods and
production tools to accommodate 300mm silicon wafers instead of the current
200mm wafer standard.'^ Larger wafers also will more easily accommodate complex chip designs, such as next-generation microprocessors and systems-on-achip, early versions of which may be too large to manufacture economically on
smaller silicon wafers."*
In contrast to previous wafer transitions, the shift from 200mm to
300mm wafers will not be orchestrated by any single firm in the industry, for
two reasons. First, experts estimate the costs and technical challenges associated
with the shift to 300mm wafers to be an order of magnitude greater than those
of previous wafer transitions.'^ The shift to 300mm wafers necessitates a more
radical overhaul of equipment tool sets than was true of previous wafer transitions, and also requires a fundamental alteration in the overall design of fabrication facilities. For example, 300mm wafers are so large and fragile that they
necessitate a higher level of automation than is used in 200mm fabs, requiring
the development of new interfaces, carriers, and software. The total development costs of 300mm tools are likely to exceed $10 billion, far higher than the
roughly $1 billion cost of developing 200mm tools in the early 1980s.'*'
A second and related reason for the lack of single-firm leadership in the
300mm wafer transition is the experiences of Intel and IBM in leading previous
wafer transitions. In each of these transitions, the "lead company" (Intel for the
100-15Dmm transition; IBM led the 150-200mm transition) purchased or produced test wafers, subsidized equipment development, and guaranteed procurement contracts for production-worthy tools.'^ Representatives of Intel and IBM
report thai the costs of individually leading these transitions (especially the need
to subsidize the development of new equipment whether or not it was eventually purchased) outweighed the benefits of having first access lo the new capabilities.^" Intel took two years longer than expected to reach full volume
production in its first 150mm fab, and IBM faced similar problems improving the
reliability of its new 200mm tools.^' Such production delays and unanticipated
tool development costs undermined the profitability of being first to manufacture chips on the new wafers.
Since the costs of 'going it alone" with the current wafer transition are so
high and no single firm can fully appropriate the returns from that investment, a
strategy of sharing some of the costs and risks across a large number of firms has
emerged. For the first time in the history of the industry, leading international
device makers developed a uniform set of standards in advance of a major wafer
transition." In setting these standards, device makers hoped to speed tool devel-
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opment and to reduce the costs of obtaining a compatible 300mm tool set for
next-generation fabs. For example, the previous, piecemeal transitions led by
single firms produced a range of incompatible equipment, forcing chip makers to
develop custom mechanical interfaces or limit their choice of suppliers. Ten different carrier systems were used for 200mni wafers, whereas device makers in
the two 300mm consortia have agreed to accept only two carrier systems for
300mm wafers, both of which must be accommodated by suppliers. Finally, the
history of successful collaboration among leading U.S. device makers in managing joint projects with supplier firms (e.g., under the auspices of SEMATECH)
may have reduced the transaction costs associated with launching a cooperative
wafer conversion initiative.

Consortium-Led Technological Change
By 1996, two consortia had been formed to lead the conversion of the
industry's capital equipment. The U.S.-based International 300mm Initiative
(I300I) consortium, established in late 1995, comprises 13 leading device makers, including firms from the United States (Intel, Texas Instruments, Motorola,
IBM, AMD, and Lucent Technologies), Europe (STMicroelectronics,'' Philips,
and Siemens), South Korea (Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics, and LG
Semicon), and Taiwan (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation,
TSMC)." A parallel effort was established in Japan, when ten leading Japanese
semiconductor firms (NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Matsushita,
Sanyo, Oki, Sharp, and Sony) established Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies, Inc. (Selete) in early 1996.'^' Together, these consortia include more
than 20 leading semiconductor manufacturers that account for most of the
world's chip production (Table 1).
As this membership roster demonstrates, the device makers'—not equipment suppliers—are leading the wafer conversion effort. The ability of leading
manufacturers from around the world to establish joint technical standards and
set goals for a broad base of suppliers is relatively rare, even though buyers are
typically more eager for standards than suppliers, who prefer higher levels of
product differentiation.^^ In this case, the ability of the device firms to dictate the
conversion sciiedule to their suppliers refieas not only the collective market
power of these customers, but also the technical dependence of suppliers on the
device makers.^^ Although other industries, such as autos, also exhibit a close
working relationship between equipment suppliers and their customers, the
complexity of semiconductor process technology has historically required suppliers to look to device makers for technical guidance.^" Device makers often provide both funding and engineering resources to their suppliers for specific
projects. One U.S. device maker, for example, estimated that it financed approximately 20 percent of the $15 million cost and nearly 40 percent of the 14,000+
engineering hours associated with a recent unsuccessful equipment modification
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T A B L E I . Founding Members of 13001 and Selete (by nationality and 1995 IC sales)

I99SIC
sales* ($b)

13001

1995 Rank in
world IC sales''

U.S. Members
Intel

$13.6

1

Texas Instruments

$7.8

6

Motorola

$ 7,2

7

IBM

$5.7

8

AMD

$ 2.4

17

Lucent

$ 1.7

24

Combined 1995 IC sales
(% of ail US firms'IC sales)

$38.4
(63%)
1

European Members

1

STMicroeieclconics (llaly/Ffance)

$ 3.0

13

Philips (Netherlands)

$ Z9

14

Siemens (Germany)

$ 2.4

18

Combined 1995 IC sales
(% of all European firms' IC sales)

$ 8.3
(78%)

Korean and Taiwanese Members
Samsung [liaaionics [S. Koi-eaj

$ 8.2

S

Hyundai Electronics (S. Korea)

$ 4.4

10

IG Semicon, Inc (S. Kore \\

$ 3.6

12

TSMC (Taiwan)

$ 1.4

25

Combined 1995 IC sales
{% of all Korean & Taiwanese firms' IC sales)

$17.6
(83%)

13001 Members' total 1995 IC sales

$64.3

project. As this example suggests, such huyer-supplier collaboration contains
risks for both parties.^"

Origin and Structure ofI300I and Selete
The structure and R&D operations of both BOOI and Selete have been
influenced by previous successful and unsuccessful large-scale R&D consortia in
the United States and Japan. In particular, the new consortia incorporate key
features of the VLSI Project and SEMATECH consortia: even though member
firms in both I300I and Selete are "horizontal" competitors in the semiconductor
market, these consortia focus on "vertical" projects aimed at ensuring the reliability and compatibility of production tools. Also, like earlier semiconductor consortia, 13001 and Selete need to define a research agenda and design a structure
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T A B L E I . FoundingMember5of 13001 and Selete (continued)

1995 IC
1995 Rank in
^* ($b) world IC sales'*

Selete
Japanese Members

$11,0
$ 8.6

2

f"fitacf
Toshiba

$ 8.6

4

Mttsubishi_

$ 4.4

Fujitsu

I 4.0

Matsushita

$ 2.6

Sanyo

$ 2.3

Oki

$ 2.0

Sharp

$ 2.0

9
11
16
20
21
22
23

NEC

Sony

J 1,9

Combined 1995 IC sales

$47,4
(91%)

{% of all Japanese firms' IC sales)

3

Notes:
a. Source; ICE, StatuiA Report on (he/fitegmtedOfaj/[/ndusE;7(Scottsdafe.AZ Integrated OTurt Engineering, Inc. 1997), based on
sales of merchant firms,
b.All but two of the top 25-ranked IC manufacturers joined either i30OI or Selete. Micron Technology, a US. firm ranked I5tJi, was
a founding member of SEMATECH but withdrew from Uie consortium in 199Z National Semiconductor, a U.S. firm ranked 19th.
is a member of both SEMATECH and its newly-fonned intemadonal subsidiary. International SEMATECH. but was not a founding
rrwmber of 13001,

that facilitates, rather than impedes, effective cooperation both among member
firms and between members and participating suppliers. Despile some similarity
in their objectives, 13001 and Selete have devised divergent solutions to these
challenges, which are central to any large-scale cooperative R&D program.
The International 300mm Initiative
The International 300mm Initiative was formally established in late 1995
as the first international subsidiary of the U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing
Technology (SEMATECH) consortium. BOOI started as an 18-monih, $26 million
project (roughly $2 million per member firm). According lo SEMATECH representatives, early plans for 13001 included an annual budget as high as $100 million, but prospective participants selected a less cosily project. BOOI's activities
have been extended into 1999, and the consortium now receives roughly $24
million per year in dues paid by member firms. 13001 is housed in SEMATECH's
Austin, Texas, facility and rents dean-room space from SEMATECH.*'
The design of 13001 builds direaly on the experience of SEMATECH. First,
I300I adopted SEMATECH's system of employing assignees from member firms
to facilitate the transfer of information back to their parent organizations.
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Approximately 90 percent of BOOI's technical positions are staffed by memberfirm assignees." Second, BOOI employs SEMATECH's cost-of-ownership (COO)
model to establish the basic guidelines and information on equipment cost and
performance." The design and management of BOOI's activities also drew on the
accumulated experience of SEMATECH managers, which may have enabled
13001 to begin its operations more quickly and easily than would have otherwise
been possible.
A third feature of BOOI reflects the lessons of SEMATECH in defining a
research agenda that facilitates cooperation among competing firms. In ihe second year of its operation, SEMATECH redirected its research agenda away from
collaborative projects among device makers aimed at improving their manufacturing process technologies toward projects between these semiconductor manufacturers and their U.S. suppliers of semiconductor equipment and materials.
The main reason for the "vertical" shift was the reluaance of U.S. device makers
to share process technologies with one another that were critical to the market
success of these competing firms.^'' Although this redirection in SEMATECH's
aaivities simplified collaboration among device makers, it created considerable
concern among equipment suppliers over the sharing or leakage of proprietary
information. In response to these concerns, most of SEMATECH's equipment
projects now take place al the facilities of individual supplier lirms instead of the
consortium's common facility, and suppliers generally own any project-related
intellectual property. Consistent with this experience, 13001 has adopted a
decentralized approach to working wilh suppliers and, like SEMATECH, evaluates most equipment at suppliers' sites, using engineers from both BOOI and the
participating supplier firm." This arrangement provides suppliers with immediate feedback on the performance of their tools and reduces the danger that proprietary information will "leak" among competing suppliers.
Unlike SEMATECH, however, BOOI does not directly fund equipment
development. Although SEMATECH continues to sponsor joint development
and equipment improvement projects with suppliers, BOOI simply evaluates
tools for basic test parameters, leaving the development and subsequent
improvement of those tools to suppliers.'* Given its commitment to tool evaluation rather than development, BOOI does not expect to own any intellectual
property based on its work with suppliers. In contrast, SEMATECH obtained 89
patents between 1989 and 1996 based on research conducted or funded by the
consortium, although the consortium now places less emphasis on owning intellectual property from projeas with suppliers."
Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies, Inc.

The Japan-based Selete consortium is a more ambitious collaborative
R&D program aimed at both the evaluation and development of 300mm tools.
The proposal for Selete was made in 1995 by the Semiconductor industry
Research Institute Japan (SIRIJ), an industry group lormed a year earlier by the
ten largest Japanese chip producers as part of a broader effort to "reactivate
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Japan's semiconductor industry."^^ Together, the members of this industry organization (NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Matsushita, Sanyo, Oki,
Sharp, and Sony) accounted for 91 percent of all Japanese firms' IC sales in
1995."
Following some discussion of joining the U.S.-based 300mm efforts, the
ten leading Japanese device makers in SIRU chose to establish a separate consortium in 1996.""* The Japanese participants of Selete committed approximately
$280 million for a five-year 300mm program, an annual budget more than twice
thai of 13001 (and nearly three limes as large on a per-member basis). This larger
R&D budget supports a broader program of collaboration and defrays a higher
share of the costs associated with 300mm equipment evaluation and development, incurred primarily by suppliers in 13001. For example, unlike 13001, Selete
pays the full cost of the expensive test wafers used in the equipment
evaluations."' Selete also established a dedicated clean-room facility in Hitachi's
Production Engineering Research Laboratory and purchased test equipment for
this facility.''^ BOOI's rented facility does not house an entire production line and
its test equipment is either under evaluation or donated by suppliers.
Yet another notable difference between Selete and 13001 is Selete's greater
centralization. In contrast to I300L equipment is typically evaluated in Selete's
central laboratory rather than in suppliers' facilities. Evaluations arc primarily
performed by Selete engineers on assignment from member firms. Tool performance is communicated to the supplier in a weekly report that may include
suggestions for improvements in the tool. Originally, all of the tools were evaluated at the central Selete facility. As the early experience of SEMATECH suggests, however, the risk of technology leakage among supplier firms may
increase when tool-related projects are conducted in a common facility.'^ Recognizing the need to ensure confidentiality to suppliers, Selete established temporary barriers between similar tools under evaluation at Selete. Selete also
modified its original structure and is evaluating some equipment at suppliers'
facilities.""*
In addition to evaluating equipment, Selete also develops and modifies
300mm tools, in contrast to the 13001 consortium where suppliers are solely
responsible for improving and developing their tools. From its inception, Selete
has been committed to generating jointly owned intellectual property based on
improvements suggested by Selete engineers to the tools under evaluation."^^ As
of mid-April 1998, Selete had finished ten evaluations and was in the process of
conducting about 30 more. By the end of fiscal year 1998, the group expects lo
apply for 10 to 20 patents, most of which would be jointly owned by Selete and
individual equipment suppliers.'"'

Discussion
The key differences between T300I and Selete are summarized in Table 2.
Selete evaluates tools for a longer time period (up to nine months, versus a 6month maximum at 13001) and in a centra! facility that includes all the elements
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T A B L E 2. Key features ofl300l and Selete
International
300nnm Initiative
(13001)

Semiconductor Leading
Edge Technologies, Inc.
(Selete)

Founding Members

6 US. firms
3 European firms
3 Korean firms*
I Taiwanese firm

10 Japanese firms''

Location

Austin.Tx. USA
(SEMATECH clean room)

Yokohama Crty, Japan
(Hitachi Laboratory)

Date Established

November 1995

February 1996

Budget(annual average)

$24 million

$56 million (¥7 billion)

Staff size (approx.)

68

ISO

Primary evaluation site

suppliers' facilities
and 13001 clean room

central Selete clean room

Type of tests

unit processes

short loops

Guidance In
technolog/ development

Indirect

Direct

Generation of
Intellectual Property?

No
(supplier-owned)

Yes
(both Selete-owned and Seletesupplier-owned anticipated)

Notes:
a, Samsung Eleciromcs Co. and LGSemicon, Inc. terminated their membership in 13001 at the end of 1997 ("Samsung Stays in
japan's 300mm Group After Leaving SEMATECH's." Electronic Buyers' News DCJJ^ Digest. February 4.1998).
b. Samsung affveti to participate in Selete in 1997, but is not a stockholder of the consortium.

of a full fabrication line. Selete also does more comprehensive electrical testing
of device substructures ("short loops") based on a fully specified process "recipe,"
which helps assess the performance of a tool when it is integrated with other
production steps. By contrast, I300I is limited to "demonstrations" of tool performance ("unit processes"), many of which are conducted at supplier sites, and its
clean-room facility is primarily used for technical support and wafer inspection.
These and other differences have contributed to difficulties over sharing of test
resuhs between the two consortia."'
The two industry consortia have also established very different vertical
relationships with supplier firms. Selete is more heavily involved in the development of production equipment, and its participating device makers have agreed
to jointly fund a larger share of the development costs associated with the
300mm wafer transition. But in contrast lo the VLSI Project and SEMATECH
consortia of previous decades, these privately funded inilialives arc unencumbered by any explicit government directive to improve the health of a domestic
base of suppliers. They are pursuing a more "open" policy of evaluating tools
from suppliers worldwide. For example, a leading Japanese supplier. Canon,
shipped a 300mm lithography system for testing at the U.S.-based 13001 consor-
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tium in 1997, and other leading suppliers from the United Stales and Europe are
participating in the demonstration activities of both consortia."* By mid-1998,
I300I and Selete had evaluated tools from vendors worldwide. Roughly 60 percent of tools evaluated by Selete were from Japanese firms, while slighdy more
than 50 percent of the tools evaluated by 13001 were from U.S. firms.''''
Despite their differences, I300I and Selete have encountered similar problems during the past 18 months, many of which are attributable to the technical
and managerial complexity of the 300mm wafer transition. First, inu al! suppliers have provided their equipment prototypes on schedule. Production-ready
300mm tools are still unavailable for some key processing steps, whicli prevents
manufacturers from implementing a complete 300mm manufacturing process.
For example, Texas Instruments has constructed a new fab, which is sitting
empty until a complete set of 300mm tools is available.^" To address this problem, SEMATECH is weighing a proposal to begin a program in 1999 (led by
13001) to develop tools in the lagging 300mm equipment areas. A related issue is
whether suppliers will adhere to the standards. I300I members have repeatedly
announced that they will demand tools from suppliers that meet the standards
set by the consortia, but it is far too soon to know if this will occur in practice.
Some companies may continue to demand customized, non-compliant tool sets
from equipment suppliers in order to optimize the performance of specific steps
for their product lines.^'
Two other unexpected factors have delayed the 300mm conversit)n
efforts. First, fastcr-than-expected reductions in ihe line widths of circuit patterns have permitted more chips to fit onto each 200mm wafer, extending ihc
productive life of 200mm fabs and equipment. Suppliers have also realized that
some productivity enhancements, such as mini-environments, which were
expected to enter the mainstream only with the 300tiim generation, can be
deployed in 200mm fabs. As a result, the early introduction of next-generation
300mm tools is now less critical than was previously thought."'^ Second, the
industry downturn that began in 1997 has made manufacturers reluctant to
invest in tools for new facilities when their existing labs are underutilized. The
Asian financial and economic crisis exacerbated the effects of the industry downturn on equipment firms by further constraining the capital expenditures of
Japanese, Korean, and (more recently) Taiwanese companies.
This combination of technical and economic tactors has delayed the transition to 300mm wafers. As recently as November 1997, chip makers were predicting that seven 300mm pilot lines would be operational in 1998 and that the
first high-volume fabs would appear in 2000. As of 1998, however, no 300mm
pilot lines are running and high-volume production Is nol expected uniil 2002.^'
For chip makers, the industry downturn and delays in the current wafer
transition have highlighted the benefits of collaboration. The risk-sharing
arrangement has functioned as planned, with no single firm suffering disproportionate losses. Nevertheless, the downturn has different near-term implications
for Selete and 13001. The device manufacturers participating in 13001 have
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largely avoided significant expenditures for the joint development of a new generation of capital equipment whose adoption now seems likely to be delayed.
Seleif members, on the other hand, have incurred more significant costs.
Although some interviewees in 1997 had predicted that Selete's centralized,
"hands-on" design would permit Japanese semiconduaor firms to launch
300mm fabs before their U.S. counterparts, Selete members now are saddled
wilh the considerable expense of operating a full 300mm dean room in the face
of a lack ol demand for this icchnology.
The consequences of the industry downturn on the 300mni transition
have been more severe for supplier firms. Ironically, equipment firms who made
the greatest effort to comply with the original timetable, having spent $25 million or more to develop each tool, are worse off than those who failed to respect
the manufacturers' schedules. These early developers are now unlikely to find
significant sales until 2002 or beyond." In light of continued uncertainty over
the timing for an industry upturn, many suppliers have scaled back their
300mm plans. The chip makers in 13001, which has shifted virtually all of these
risks to suppliers, have responded by calling a series of summit meetings with
suppliers to reduce some of the uncertainty they face in their 300mm tool development efforts.
This sudden change in the market outlook for 300mm technologies illustrates an insufficiently appreciated risk of industry-wide collaboration in environments characterized by fundamental uncertainty, which accurately describes
most high-technology industries. The formulation of an industry-wide "vision"
or technology "roadmap" may increase, rather than reduce, the risks that
unforeseen developments will render the best-laid plans irrelevant." Timing is
difficult in any rapidly changing environment. But the tendency of such industry-wide collaboration io concentrate technological or economic bets may
increase the collective exposure of firms to unexpected developments.

Global Firms, National Governments
The efforts of 13001 and Selete are still underway, and their long-range
outcomes and effeas cannot be forecast with confidence. This uncertainty
notwithstanding, the formation and operation of these ventures indicates an
unprecedented level of cooperation within and across national borders in preparation for the conversion of the semiconductor industry's capital equipment to
new 300mm wafers. The U.S.-based 13001 progiam represents the first time that
leading semiconductor firms from seven countries have agreed to conduct joint
projects on their manulacturing technologies under one organizational
umbrella, and these firms are coordinating some of their efforts with the Japanbased Seiete consortium. Moreover, both 13001 and Seiete are evaluating tools
from a global base of equipment and materials suppliers. Ahhough device makers have long been engaged in a complex web of bilateral alliances and have
purchased tools from specialized suppliers from around the world, this relatively
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high level of international cooperation among such a broad base of competing
manufacturers is without parallel in the history of this and other capital-intensive, politically-charged industries {e.g., automobiles or aerospace).
Do these private initiatives support the view that the role of national governments is greatly curtailed in an era of international, liigh-technology firms?'*
Not necessarily. On the one hand, BOOI suggests that the role of government in
these industry-wide efforts is diminishing—with the end of federal funding, this
offshoot of the SEMATECH consortium was able to include non-U.S. firms as full
members and as participating suppliers. Selete, however, provides weaker support for this view. The Japanese consortium coincides with a new wave of government-funded semiconductor R&D initiatives in Japan. As discussed below,
some of these publicly funded projects were designed to complement those conducted by the private consortium, and several are physically located at Selete's
clean-room facility.
Cutting Public Ties: The International Expansion of SEMATECH
One of the most significant changes in the historic ties between semiconductor research consortia and national governments is illustrated by the international expansion of SEMATECH and the formation of BOOI." From 1987-1996,
SEMATECH received over $850 million in dues from its members, leading U.S.
semiconductor manufaaurers, and roughly $850 million in matching funds
from the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.'^'* Although the
industry-government partnership was planned to last from 1987-1992, federal
contributions continued for an additional four years. By ihe mid-1990s, however, improvements in the health of the U.S. semiconductor industry and its
domestic supplier base coincided with a shift in Congressional attitudes to a
more skeptical view of programs aimed at assisting industrial sectors such as
semiconduaors." Federal funding of SEMATECH ceased in 1996.
With federal funds drawing to an end, SEMATECH faced a choice
between scaling back its research agenda or attracting additional dues-paying
members. In the end, it did both. In 1995, SEMATECH began reducing its operating budget to prepare for the end of federal funding and initiated plans for
including non-U.S. firms in a set of international projects. In this context, one of
BOOI's most significant accomplishments to date may be its role in paving the
way for an expansion of SEMATECH. In 1998, the remaining members of BOOI
joined a new, more ambitious "International SEMATECH" (see Table 3), another
subsidiary of SEMATECH. Assignees of firms from seven countries will work on
a set of joint International SEMATECH projects, including the continued 300mm
activities of BOOI, a larger project on photolithography (one ol the most critical
technologies used in semiconductor manufacturing), and two other projeas on
manufacturing methods and environmental, safety, and health standards.'^" In
1999, BOOI (now a division of International SEMATECH) expects to phase out
its tool evaluation activities and take on the more difficult task of selecting tools
for joint development or improvement projects.'''
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T A B L E 3 . Members of SEMATECH, International SEMATECH, and 13001

Original
SEMATECH

International
SEMATECH

Original
13001

New

AMD

AMD

AMD

AMD

Digital Semiconductor

Digital Semiconducior

Digital Semiconductor^

Hev^'lett Packard

t-lewlett Packard

Hewlett Packard

IBM

IBM

IBM

IBM

Intel

Intel

Intel

Intel

Lucent (AT&T)

Lucent

Lucent

Lucent

Motorola

Motorola

MotonDia

Motorola

National Semicon.

National Semicon,

Rockwell

Rockwell

Texas Instruments

Texas Instruments

Texas Instruments

Texas Instruments

Hyundai (S Korea)

Hyundai (S. Korea)

Hyundai (S. Korea)

Philips Semicon.
(Europe)

Philips Semicon.
(Europe)

Philips Semicon.
(Europe)

Siemens (Eunope)

Siemens (Europe)

Siemens (Eurape)

STM icroelectronics
(Europe)

STM icroelectronics
(Europe)

STMicroelectronics
(Eurc^)

13001

National Semicon.
Rockwell

Harris Semiconduetor'
LSI Logic"
Micron Technology'

TSMC (Taiwan)

• ' [ • • • -

[ , , V . . . : .

LG Semicon (S. Korea)"^
Samsung (S. Korea)'^

Notes: aWrttidrew from SEMATtCH in 1993
b. Withdrew from SEMATECH in 1992
c.Witiidrew frDm 13001 in 1997
d.Acquired by Intel in May 1998
Sources: SEMATECH; modified from Global 300 mm Pepon June 1998.

This international expansion of SEMATECH created some political concerns among its former supporters in the federal govemment. Although SEMATECH's government funding had ended, its plans to include European, Taiwanese,
and Korean firms in its research programs raised concerns in Washington that
the body of manufacturing knowledge created by SEMATECH over the past
decade with the aid of federal monies would "spill over" to non-U.S. firms.
Executives at SEMATECH adopted several procedures to allay these political
concerns. For example, the foreign companies participating in International
SEMATECH must obtain written permission from SEMATECH in order to use
unpublished technical data generated by SEMATECH members with past federal
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assistance. In addition, foreign members of the consortium were not guaranteed
the right to license SEMATECH patents and must obtain written approval for use
of these inventions.^'^
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that SEMATECH's international offshoot
includes no Japanese semiconductor firms. Given the fact that SEMATECH's
original objectives were to improve the competitiveness of U.S. semiconductor
manufacturers relative to their Japanese competitors, Japanese membership in an
international subsidiary (if SEMATECH may well have been politically infeasible.
At a minimum, the inclusion of Japanese device makers in International
SEMATECH would have increased the intensity of the political criticism.**

Renewed Industry-Government Partnerships in Japan?
The Japanese-led Selete consortium illustrates a very different relationship between the private consortium and public-sector initiatives. Selete is one
of several important Japanese semiconductor projects that have been launched
in the past few years. Collectively, these projects represent the largest set of private-public programs aimed at semiconductor technologies since the wellknown VLSI Project of the 1970s.*'"* Organizational walls divide the private
initiatives from public ones within this collection of projects. Nonetheless, the
origins and broader research agenda of Selete are enmeshed with important
semiconductor projects funded by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), even though Selete's 300mm program is funded and led
entirely by private finns.
In the early stages of Selete's establishment, the ten Japanese device makers (in the SIRIJ industry group) sought government funding for two broad
areas of collaborative R&D—300mm evaluation and development, and five
other semiconductor projects aimed at refining and developing more advanced
manufacturing technologies. After reviewing the SIRU proposal, MITI agreed to
fund the latter set of semiconductor projects as part of a new consortium, the
Association of Super-advanced Electronics Technologies (ASET).*"^ ASET was
launched in early 1996, and received $100 million from MITI during the first
year of its operation (see Table 4).*'^ Separately, SIRU members established a
parallel 300mm program in the privately funded Selete consortium.
The common origins of Selete and the semiconductor projects of ASET
are reflected in the complementary design of the two research endeavors.''^ During the first two years of its operations, for example, ASET rented clean-room
space from Selete. Two of ASET's semiconductor projects (in advanced lithography) were physically located at Selete's central facility and were run by members
of Selete. Finally, in 1997, the results of one ot ASET's capstone semiconductor
projects (in ArF lithography) were transferred to Selete for continued
development.^*
The renewed partnership between Japanese device makers and the
Japanese government is not, however, a simple replay of the past. Most notably,
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T A B L E 4 . An Overview of Major and Recent Semiconductor Consortia
in the United States and Japan

Average Annual
Budget (current $)'

Percent
Public Funds

1976-86
(Government funds
ended in 1980)

$70 million (FY 1976-79)

1976-79:40%

$40 million (FY 1980-86)

1980-86:0%

1987-present
(Government funds
ended FY 1996)

$200 million (1988-94)

1988-94:50%

$180 million (1995-96)"

1995-96:50%

$160 million (1997-98)^

1997-98:0%

Consortium

Years

VLSI Project

SEMATECH

13001

1996-present

$24 million

0%

International
SEMATECH
(tncl. 13001)

1998-present

$7S million
(April-December 1998)

0%

Selete

1996-p[-esent

$56 million

ASET

1996-present

$70 million (of which
approximately 80% is
semiconductor-related)

100% (firms pay
indirect costs only)

Notes;
a. Budget estimates are derived from the following sources: for VLSI Project see Flamm, {MismanagedTrade? op.cit): for
SEMATECH. 13001, and International SEMATECH. see SEMATECH (1997. op.cit) plus personal communicabon; for Selete. see
Selete (1997, op, ciL). for ASFT see ASET (1997. op, ctt) and personal communication,
b, 1996 budget includes 13001
c 1997 budget includes 13001: 1998 includes International SEMATEOi

the Japanese semiconductor firms played a guiding role in orchestrating the
publicly funded ASET project. During Japan's "catch up" phase in ihc 1970s,
MITI and NTT (then a state-owned telecommunications firm) provided much of
the impetus for the creation of the VLSI Project and its parallel projects with
suppliers.^'' As Japan entered the 1980s, however, the ability of the government
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T A B L E 4, An Overvievi' of Major and Recent Semiconductor Consortia
in the United States and Japan (continued)

Consortium

Member Firms

Suppliers

Primary Activities

VLSI Project

Rve Japanese device makers: (NEC.
Fujitsu, HitachiToshiba, Mitsubishi)

Japanese
only

R&D on device, pnxess.
materials, packaging, design,
and test technologies needed
for million-transistor chips

SEMATECH

Ten U.S.-based device makers (as of
1997); {AMD, Digital H-R IBM Intel,
Lucent. Motorola. National, RockwellTI)

Mainly U.S.

Current Technology Areas;
interconnect front end processes,
assembly and packaging, design
systems, manufacturing methods.

13001

Original members: 6 SEMATECH
members + 3 Korean. I Taiwanese.
3 European firms; in 1998. includes all
members of Intemationai SEMATECH
(see Table 3)

Global

Standards, 300mm tool evaluation

Intemationai
SEMATECH
(ind. 13001)

All 10 SEMATECH members +
I Korean, I Taiwanese, 3 European
Hrms (seeTable 3),

Global

Standards, 300mm tool
development lithography,
environmental, heahh & safety

Selete

Ten Japanese device makers; (NEC,
Hitachi,Toshiba, M'rtsubishi, Fujitsu,
Matsushita, Sanyo. Oki. Sharp, Sony)

Global

300mm tool evaluation and
development, advanced
technology development
(lithography, computer-aided
design)

ASFT

16 members of semiconductor projects; 10 Selete members + 4 Japanese
equipment firms (Advantest,jEOL Ltd.
SPC Electronics,Toshiba Machine Co.)
+ I Japanese government lab (NTT-AT)
+ I Japanese subsidiary of a U.S. firm
lTexa5 Instruments)

Japanese
only

6 semiconductor R&D pnsjects:
3 in lithography. I in mask fabrication, I in diagnostics, I in
particle control and cleaning
(the only semiconductor project
including non-Japanese firm)

to implement an effective Industrial policy in the electronics industry declined.
The success of Japanese fimis translated into larger corporate R&D budgets and
"increasingly confident Japanese firms cast off their dependence on MITI and
refused to contribute funds to MITI consortia."'" During the 1980s, a second
shift occurred in MlTl-sponsored projects with high-technology firms: MITI redirected its joint projects with industry away from the "catch uji" programs aimed
at improving existing technologies developed in the United States and toward
projeas that would advance the technological frontier/' The result was that
MITI's two major R&D efforts in the electronics and information technology
seaors in the 1980s, the Supercomputer and Fifth Generation projects, focused
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on long-term R&D, faced resistance by companies, were hamstrung by small
budgets, and ultimately were not very successful.'^
Within this context, the creation of Seleie and ASET represents a new era
of private-public collaboration in Japan, triggered by the first major challenge to
the competitive performance of Japanese device makers since the 1970s. Rather
than being coerced into collaboration, which was the case in the 1970s, leading
Japanese semiconductor firms initiated the latest round of cooperation. Needless
to say, in the absence of a competitive crisis in the Japanese semiconductor
industry, it is unlikely that projects of this magnitude would have been
launched.
Conclusion
Although the competitive performance of semiconductor firms in the
global market is driven by a complex array of macroeconomic, technological,
and institutional influcnces,^^ the two newly formed semiconductor consortia
examined here—the U.S.-based International 300mm Initiative and the Japanbased Selete consortium—are closely tied to the historic ebbs and flows in ihe
relative performance of U.S. and Japanese firms. The formation of I300I coincided with a period of relative strength for U.S. semiconductor manufacturers
and the domestic base of suppliiT firms. Perhaps as a result, BOOI's members
were reluctant to fund a major development project, settling for a less ambitious
set of activities aimed at setting standards and demonstrating tool performance.
However, the importance of I30DI extends beyond its relatively narrow ro!e in
ihe 300mm wafer conversion. I300I has already been an important experiment
of international collaboration for its parent organizalion, SEMATECH—which,
having shed its partnership with the U.S. government in 1996, created a new
"International SEMATECH" in 1998.
By contrast, the Japan-based Selete consortium was established at a time
when leading Japanese device makers were engaged in efforts to reactivate the
Japanese industry in order to address their collective problems in worldwide
semiconductor markets. In the i990s, Japanese device makers lost market share
to South Korean and Taiwanese firms in commodity product lines (e.g., DRAMs)
that depend on manufacturing expertise and high-volume production. At the
same time, Japanese firms have failed to make significant inroads in the lucrative, design-intensive end of the market (e.g., microprocessors) that remains
dominated by U.S. firms. In response, Japanese semiconduaor manufacturers
launched an ambitious program aimed at improving next-generation manufacturing technologies based on the new wafer standard, and did so in conjunction
with a large, publicly funded initiative, ASET.
From this perspeaive, the formation of Selete and ASET is analogous to
the establishment of the U.S. SEMATHCH consortium in the 1980s and Japan's
VLSI Project in the preceding decade: periods of "collective crisis" have resulted
in "collective action" that involves industry-wide coordination and, periodically,
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joint government-industry action in both nations' semiconductor industries. The
critical nature of semiconductor components as inputs to the electronics,
telecommunications, and computer industries means that governments are
reluctant to ignore the erosion in the competitive performance of their domestic
firms, while firms appear more likely to turn to governments during times of
economic strain. At a minimum, this tendency suggests that a truly "borderless"
world of global firms, one in which national governments exercise little or no
influence, remains a distant mirage.
The lingering role of governments in shaping private sector collaboration
is only one of several lessons from these consortia. A key difference between
both I300I and Selete and the landmark semiconductor consortia of the past
(i.e., SEMATECH and the VLSI Project) is that these new initiatives have been
devised and funded by private firms; any government influence on the structure
and design of these consortia was indirect. As such, these industry consortia
yield imponant insights concerning the private incentives for collaboration
among firms in this industry. The semiconductor industry appears to be unique
in the extent to which leading manufacturers are now working together worldwide to establish uniform standards for manufacturing technologies. The complexity and costs of semiconductor manufacturing, combined with the short
product life cycles and rapid pace of technological change in this industry, have
triggered an unprecedented level of collaboration among device makers in guiding the industry's conversion to 300mm wafers.'' Furthermore, without the
direct involvement of governments in their collective activities, both of these
consortia chose to include a broad base of suppliers from around the world in
their venical projects.
A more cautionary lesson from these privately held consortia is that even
in the face of unprecedented cooperation, the transition to a new technology
(300mm wafers in this case) may be impeded by unforeseen events. The recent
industry slowdown and the faster-than-expected improvements in 200mm fabs
have delayed the need to introduce 300mm tools. As noted earlier, this situation
illustrates an important risk associated with the colleaive priority-setting and
technological forecasting of industry-wide consortia. By the summer of 1998,
what was once called "collaboration" was deemed a "crisis," as supplier firms
found it difficult to support their investments in 300mm tools when purchase
dates slipped further into the future.
The projects at I300I and Selete are still underway. Whether these consortia will be remembered for ushering in a new era of international cooperation
among semiconductor manufacturers and their suppliers, or for contributing to
its demise, remains to be seen.
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USCAR is roughly comparable to SEMATECH, conduaing a wide range of precompetitive activities in cooperation with various sets of vendors. It has not yet
been revealed how USCAR will respond to its potential internationalization following the takeover of Chrysler by Germany's Daimler-Benz.
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27. Semicondudor producers originally developed their equipment internally. Independent equipment producers emerged in the United States in the 1970s and,
soon thereafter, in Europe and Japan. W.,I. Spencer and P. Grindley, "SEMATECH
after Five Years: High-Technology Consortia and U.S. Compeiitiveness," California
Management Review, 35/4 (Summer 1993): 9-32.
28. M.M. Appleyard, "The Strategic Development of Equipment; Buyer-Supplier CoDevelopment in the Semiconductor Industry," Darden Working Paper Series
DSWP-98-05, Colgate Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia. 1998. hi a more recent development, some large suppliers,
such as U.S.-based Applied Materials, have integrated their produci lines more
fully and arc performing some of the lests typically conducted by manufacturers.
"Applied Opens Metrology Lab to Accelerate 300-mm Work," Semiconductor Business News Online. iuXy 10, 1997.
29. Appleyard, op. cit. The device maker attributed the failure to a lack of involvement by the supplier early in the overall process development project of which
the tool was one element.
30. A fundamental risk faced by the industry is whether the capital costs of nextgeneration fabs will undermine the profitability of the 300mm transition. The goal
set by device manufacturers is that 300mm capital costs should not exceed 1.3x
those for 200mm fabs, but the cost of some pieces of equipment will most likely
exceed this target. "SEMI's 300-mm Symposium: Tough Times Slow the Wafer
Transition," Global 300mm Report (July 1998).
31. Some administraEive and pntcedural safeguards were ptit in place to separate the
aaiviiies of I300I and SEMATECH, in part because of the higher dues paid by
SEMATECH members (four of which were nol part of I300I until 1998) and, perhaps more importantly, because of lingering political concerns over the leakage to
foreign firms of research that was previously supported by U.S. government funds
(also discussed below). See, "SEMATECH Vowing to Protect Taxpayer-Funded
R&D Data," New Technology Business Week. February 9, 1998.
32. SEMATECH, 1997 Annual Report: 10 Years of Shared Experience. (Austin, TX:
SEMATECH, 1997).
33. The cost-of-ownership model estimates the lifetime cost—including purchase,
support, service, and maintenance costs—for individual pieces of equipment and
has proved to be very beneficial in guiding tool development. For example, Intel
estimates that use of the COO model has reduced by more than 50 percent the
operating costs associated with a Lam Research etching tool. Grindley et al., op.
dt.
34. Grindley et al., op. dt. While SEMATECH spent roughly 20 percent of its 1988
budget on supplier contracts, over 60 percent of it $200 million 1991 budget was
allocated to these external activities. U.S. General Accounting Office, SEMATECH's
Technological Progress and Proposed R&D Program. GAO/RCED-92-233BR (Washing-

ton, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1992).
35. According to representatives from I300I, half of the demonstrations conducted by
May 1998 had taken place off-site at supplier firms. 13001 evaluates some tools,
espedally ones used to support the overall demonstration process, in the clean
room it leases from SEMATECH.
36. As discussed below, however, the nexi phase of BOOI's 300mm-reIated activities
may involve joint projects with suppliers on selected pieces of equipment, interview with Frank Robertson, General Manager, 13001, May 1998.
37. SEMATECH, SEMATECH Technology Patents. Technology Transfer Report
#93O3151588B-XFR (Austin. TX: SEMATECH. Inc., 1995); updates available at
http://www.semalech.org/public/general/issued.him.
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i&. K. Flamm, Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and the Semiconductor Industry (Wash-

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

160

ington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1996). As discussed below, this industry
"think tank" proposed and funded several initiaiives. including the Seiete consortium, several semiconductor projects lundcd by MITI (discussed in ihe section
titled "Global Firms, National Governments" in this article), and the Semiconductor Technology Academic Research Center (STARC), 3 program modeled explicitly
after the U.S. Semiconductor Research Center (SRC) that funds university
research. Interview with Taro Okabe, Executive Researcher and Aaing Executive
Director of SIRIJ, July 1998; see also Flamm, op. cit.
Since 199'5, SIRIJ has added three new members, of which one (TI Japan) is a
Japanese subsidiary of a U.S. firm and another (Nippon Motorola) is a joint venture between a Japanese and a U.S. firm. Flamm, op. cit. These new SIRIJ members have noi joined Selete.
In a July 15, 1995, letter to SEMATECH, the director of SIRU cited three reas(ms
for the decision by Japanese device makers to decline the invitation to join 13001:
the distance between Japan and Austin, Texas (where the I30QI consortium
would be located), language barriers, and differences between leading U.S. and
Japanese device makers in their "philosophies" nf manufacturing. The letter stated
further that "a few leading Japanese companies siill believe that they have to
have unique production equipments [sic] in order to differentiate their products
from others. I think such philosophy is not popular in the U.S." The Japanese
executives we interviewed also asserted that the global semiconductor equipment
seaor benefits from having two consortia instead of one. In theory, ihe existence
of two separate consortia working on the 300mm transition may avoid "lock-in"
to sub-opiimal equipment specifications. See W.B. Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, 99
{1989): U6-131, and P.A. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." American
Economic Review. 75 (1985): 332-337 on how the early, widespread adoption of
one standard may lock-out emerging but superior alternatives.
One of the largest expenses in the transition effort is the purchase of the 300mm
wafers used for testing. A reliability tesi can use 1,000 or more wafers, which cost
about $1,000 apiece. BOOI pays 20 percent of the cost of wafers used for testing
with the suppliers covering the rest. In contrast, Selete purchases all of its test
wafers. Selete, "Status of 300mm Program at Selete," SEMICON West '97 presentation, July 16, 1997.
As discussed below, Selete's clean room not only houses the consortium's 300mmrelated activities, but also supports "advanced technology research" programs in
specific equipment areas, such as next-generation optical lithography and electron-beam direct writing technologies, which are supported by additional dues
from member firms. Selete, op. cit. For example, Selete's first advanced technology research program—budgeted at $8 million through the year 2000—was a
computer-aided design project that simulated devices and processes. Selete's projects in advanced lithography and e-beam direct writing technologies are affiliated
with government-funded projects in a separate initiative (discussed below). See,
"Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies, Inc. (Selete) Starts New Research on
Future Technologies," Selete Press Release, July 10, 1997.
An executive we interviewed in 1997 from a major U.S. equipment firm
expressed concern thai participation in Selete would give the firm's Japanese
competitors access to their proprietary technologies. Because of these concerns,
the firm postponed shipment of its most critical tool to Selete until additional
safeguards were put in place. [The representative from the equipment firm preferred to remain anonymous.j According to Hiroyoshi Komiya of Selete, however,
Selete has taken considerable strides to ensure the confidentiality of lool-related
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44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

53.

information; although suppliers had initial questions about the security of proprietary information at Selete, Dr. Komiya was unaware of any reluctance among
suppliers to place tools at the common facility. Written comments provided by
Hiroyoshi Komiya, Executive Vice President and COO of Selete, September !998.
Interview with Hiroyoshi Komiya, Executive Vice President and COO of Selete,
May 1998.
An engineer interviewed in this study stated that tool "tweaks" (i.e., minor
changes) constitute some of the most valuable inEellectual property in the semiconductor equipment industry.
Written comments provided by Hiroyoshi Komiya, Executive Vice President and
COO of Selete, September 1998.
The potential cost savings from cooperation to avoid redundancy are considerable.
For example, each consortium puts semiconductor production equipment through
"marathon' and "ironman" tests, which cost around $1 million each, lo evaluate
the stability of the equipment using different manufaauring processes and to
assess the reliability of the equipment. A.S. Longo, "The Evaluation and Implementation of Process Technologies in Semiconduaor Manufaauring," unpublished master's thesis, MIT Sloan School of Management, 1995, at p, 1. Each
group, however, conducts these tests somewhat differently and cooperation has
proved to be more elusive in this area than in standards-setting aaivities. By the
end ol 1997, following two years of discussion, some agreement had been reached
on a joint "ironman"-style test, one of which was conduaed in early 1998. Interview with Frank Robertson, General Manager, 13001, May 1998. The consortia
have also worked together on developing "unified metrics" for equipment, which
would establish consistent targets for suppliers. By December 1997, they had
converged on metrics for 15 tools capable of 250 nanometer (nm) processing and,
by June 1998, metrics had been agreed upon for an additional !7 tools capable of
processing at the more advanced 180nm technology. I300I presentation at SEMICON West, July 1998.
In 1997,13001 started demonstration projects of tools from a number of different
vendors worldwide, including Applied Materials (U.S.), JEOL (Japan), Leica
(Europe), TEL (Japan), Tencor (U.S.) and Verteq (U.S. ); ICE, op. cit. at p. 7-10.
Interviews with Hiroyoshi Komiya, Executive Vice President and COO of Selete,
and Frank Robertson, General Manager, I300L May 1998.
Texas instruments presentation at SEMI 3rd Annual 300mm Symposium, June
16, 1998.
"SEMI Regional Meeting Focuses on 300-mm Transition Status," Global 300mm
Report. March 1998. Non-compliance is a risk in any standards effort. For example, the Open Systems movement in midrange computers was splintered by the
1988 creation of the Open Software Foundation in response to AT&T's perceived
dominance of tbe UNIX standard. Gabel, op. cit.. Chapter 5.
This is a common problem in electronics and complicates the timing of new product introduaions. For example, producers of long-established cathode ray tubes
have continued to make improvements and cost reduaions, providing a moving
target for competing technologies such as liquid crystal and plasma displays. See,
for example, B. Bowonder, S,L, Sarnot, M.S. Rao, and T. Miyake, "Competition in
tbe Global Electronics Industry: Strategies of Major Players," International Journal
of Technology Management, 12/5&6, Spedal Issue (1996), pp. 551-576.
"SEMI Regional Meeting Focuses on 300-mm Transition Status," Global 300mm
Report, March 1998, The one 1998 pilot line predicted in the March forecast—a
Siemens-Motorola joint venture in Dresden, Germany—has been delayed due to
lack of a complete tool set. "Siemens Hedging on Whether It Will Meet 300-mm
Schedule," Semiconductor Business News (August, 1998).
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54. "Applied Materials Profit Drops, Forecasting an Industry Slump," Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition. July 13, 1998.
55. For exampk', some industry representatives have called into question ihe need for
300nini wafers, suggesting the need to move to 400mm wafers insiead. "Could
400-mm Wafers Be Coming Sooner?" Semiconduaor Business News. June 15, 1998.
56. Dunning, op. cit.
57. Restrictions on foreign participation in SEMATECH were originally put in place
because of the U.S. government's contributions and the objective of the consortium to bolster the domestic semiconductor industry. Grindlt-y el al., op. cit.
58. J.B. Horrigan, "Cooperation Among Competitors in Research Consortia: The Evolution of
MCCand SEMATECH." unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas at
Austin, 1996.
59. Ham and Mowery, op. cii.
60. International SEMATECH is a wholly owned subsidiary of SEMATECH, although
each company has its own advisory board structure. Both International SEMATECH and SEMATECH are funded by dues from member companies, wiih funding
divided about evenly between the two. Overall member dues to SEMATECH did
not change as a result of the expansion; some ongoing SEMATECH projects were
simply transferred to the international subsidiary. See Table 4 for information on
the projects conducted by the two organizations.
61. These projecis may be absorbed into other divisions of International SEMATECH
at that lime.
62. M. Crawford, "SEMATECH Vowing to Protea Taxpayer-Funded RfrD Data." New
Technology Week, February 9, 1998.
63. A SEMATECH executive we interviewed speculated that, had the Japanese joined
13001, Congress might have derailed the entire initiative. Debate over granting
membership to non-U.S. firms rang through the halls of the U.S. RfrD establishment in the 1980s, and was revived quite recently by the controversial EUV consortium, an industry group led by Intel that wanted to include Nikon, a Japanese
supplier of nearly half the world's semiconductor lithography equipment, in a
collaborative RfrD projea with U.S. government engineers. In the end. Congress
barred the direct participation of non-U.S. firms (including Nikon) in the projea,
but allowed the results of the project to be licensed to equipment suppliers worldwide. See, "Global Chip Effort Set: International SEMATECH: Consortium May Be
Hindered by Lack of Japanese Firms," Mercury Center (San Jose Mercury News
Online), February 3, 1998; "U.S.-Eunded Technology Stays Here for Now," U.S.
Newsand World Report. May 18, 1998, p. 5.
64. Flamm, op. cit.
65. Interview with Taro Okabe, Acting Executive Director, Semiconductor Industry
Research Institute Japan (SIRIJ), July 1998. The decision by MITI to fund only the
second set of longer-term projects may stem from a desire by the Japanese govemtiient to stay within the boutidaries of the new GATT rules that define "nonactionable" RfrD subsidies of national governments (Flamm, op. cit.). For an
analysis of the GATT rules, see H. Furuya, "Comparative Techtiology Policy for the
Semiconductor Industry in Japan and the United States," unpublished master's
thesis, Stanford Program in International Legal Studies, Stanford Law School,
1998; U.S. General Accounting Office, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Uruguay Round Final Act Should Produce Overall U.S. Economic Gains. Volume 2,
GAO/GGD-94-83B (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1994).
66. ASET's funding duritig the current financial crisis sheds new light on the political
rationale for industrial policy in contemporary Japan. In 1997, due to general
budget cuts, ASET's funding was only $20 million. But in 1998, the funding was
raised to more than $70 million as part of a fiscal stimulus package.
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67. In addition to the five semiconductor projects proposed by the members of Seleie,
MITI agreed to fund an additional semiconduaor project (on particle contamination) that includes the Japan-based subsidiary of a US. Hrm, Texas Instruments.
MITI also added projects to ASET in liquid crystal displays and magnetic storage
devices, which include hotfi Japanese firms and the Japanese-based subsidiaries of
3 foreign firms. See ASET, Present Activities and Future Vision of the Association of
Super-Advanced Electronics Technologies (Tokyo: Electronic industries Association of
Japan, 1997). Only Japanese device manufacturers and sui)pliers, however, are
involved in the five central semiconductor projects of ASET (sec- Table 4).
68. The second ASET projea housed at Selete was terminated at the end of fiscal year
1997. Written comments by Hiroyoshi Komiya, Executive Vice President and
COO, Selete, September 1998. The fact that ASET's ArF litiiograiihy project was
transferred to Selete within such a relatively short tinieframe appears to support
Flamm's assessment that ASET is "best understood as advanced development
effort than basic research...Idespite being] characterized by its promoters as 'fundamental' or 'basic' technologies for future generation manufacturing." K, Elamm,
"Japan's New Semiconductor Technology Programs," ATIP Rcjiort #96.091, Asian
Technology Information Program, www.atip.org, 1996, at p. 8.
69. According to Fransman, the Japanese device makers only accepted tbe joint laboratory portion of MITl's proposed organization because they "were forced to do
so" in order to get the private research subsidies from MITI that they really
wanted. Eransman, op. cit., p. 63.
70. S. Callon, Divided Sun: MITI and the Breakdown of Japanese High-Tech Industrial Policy,
1975-93 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), at p. 13.
71. M. Anchordoguy, "Japan at a Technological Crossroads: Does Change Support
Convergence Theory?" Journal of Japanese Studies. 23/2(1997): 363-397; Callon,
op. dt.
72. Callon, op, dt.
73. See Macher et al., op. cit., for a thorough discussion of these issues.
74. Industry participants on hotb sides of the Pacific have considered deriving a joint
technology roadmap for the direction ol semiconductor technologies well into the
future, although the benefits of these efforts are still being debated. "Work Starts
on Global IC Roadmap," Semiconductor Business News, July 15, 1998.
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